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Patchen Markell offers a critique of the political pursuit of recognition in Bound by 
Recognition. In this thesis, I respond directly to Markell’s central argument in order to 
rethink, rather than abandon, the political pursuit of recognition through a textual 
interpretation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. I read Frankenstein as an exemplary tale of 
the struggle for identity recognition, wherein Victor Frankenstein’s Creature— his famous 
“Monster”— attempts to “un-monster” himself by demanding that others recognize his 
positively affirmed self-identity as a “kind and feeling friend.” Ultimately, the tragedy of 
Frankenstein is that the Creature cannot see himself as anything other than a monster—he is 
never afforded the recognition he desperately desires. Contra Markell, I argue that the 
Creature’s pursuit of recognition fails because he cannot single-handedly overcome the 
asymmetrical power relations that underlie the social construction of identity, and that are 



















II) Contemporary Debates About Recognition……………………………………………....3 
 
III) Mary Shelley and the World She Inhabited:  
      A Brief Biological and Historical Background………………………………………….12 
 
IV) Shelley’s Frankenstein: The Social Construction of Identity…………………………..17  
 
      The Misrepresentation of Reality………………………………………………………..21 
 
      The Materialization of a Misrepresented Reality………………………………………..24  
 
      The Discursive Construction of Identity………………………………………………...26 
       
V) Lessons from the Tragedy of Frankenstein:  















This paper is a study of contemporary debates about the “politics of recognition.” 
Building off of mainstream views of distributive justice that primarily concern themselves with 
the fair distribution of goods— money, power, and opportunity— proponents of recognition such 
as Charles Taylor have suggested that due recognition of a group or individual’s self-identity is a 
basic human need (Taylor 1997, 104). However, this renewed interest in recognition has come 
under increasing scrutiny within the last few years, and several critics persuasively argue that the 
political pursuit of recognition should be abandoned. Recently, Patchen Markell offered an 
elaborate critique of the pursuit of recognition in the influential book, Bound by Recognition. 
Drawing from Arendt, Markell argues that the pursuit of recognition is doomed to fail since 
identity construction is an ongoing and unpredictable enterprise, achieved intersubjectively in an 
often incoherent world of meaning (Markell 2003, 154). Although I engage with several authors 
concerned with the concept of recognition in this thesis, I respond directly to Markell’s central 
argument in an effort to re-think and re-orient, rather than abandon, the political pursuit of 
recognition.       
In my analysis of contemporary debates about recognition, I offer a textual interpretation 
of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. At first glance, I realize that Frankenstein may appear to be an 
unlikely source. However, I read Frankenstein as an exemplary tale of the struggle for identity 
recognition. Over the course of the novel, the reader is invited to explore the ways in which 
Victor Frankenstein’s Creature, his famous “Monster,” attempts to “un-monster” himself by 
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demanding that the other characters in the novel recognize his self-identity as a “kind and feeling 
friend” (F, 95). Ultimately, the tragedy of Frankenstein is that the Creature cannot see himself as 
anything other than a monster—he is never afforded the identity recognition he so desperately 
desires. Contra Markell, however, I argue that the Creature’s failure to resist the externally 
imposed identity of monster is not primarily a result of the human condition of finitude, although 
I agree that identities are constructed intersubjectively and that identities are unfixed, multiple, 
and subject to change. Instead, I argue that the Creature fails to achieve a more human identity 
because he cannot single-handedly overcome the asymmetrical power relations that underlie the 
social construction of identity, and that are reinforced through the construction of his identity as 
monster. In order to demonstrate how processes of social construction constitute the Creature as 
monster, I adopt Nancy Hirschmann’s “three level” framework of social construction as outlined 
in The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom as the organizational format of 
my textual analysis (Hirschmann 2003).      
Ultimately, my reading of Frankenstein suggests that the normative goals of political 
pursuits of recognition are worth pursuing, even though Charles Taylor’s conception of 
recognition is misguided in fundamental ways. As evidenced by the miserable fate of the 
Creature—he suffers from psycho-emotional distress, social exclusion, and economic poverty— 
members of oppressed groups unjustly suffer from real and damaging effects of identity-based 
subordination. Keeping the detrimental effects of the social construction of demeaning identities 
at the forefront of my analysis, I argue that political theorists concerned with social justice 
should learn from the tragedy of Frankenstein: we must recognize and acknowledge that we 
participate unevenly in processes of social construction in order to better understand how 
oppressive groups often have the power to define the oppressed (Hirschmann 2003, 101). 
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Because identities are socially constructed, recognition should not be conceived as a “good” 
within a distributive paradigm of justice; this approach invokes the concept of a fixed, authentic 
identity. Instead, recognition should be understood as a matter of procedural justice, wherein 
justice requires social arrangements that permit all members of society to not only interact face-
to-face with one another as peers in processes of social construction but also challenge discursive 
power structures through deconstruction and the resignification of social meaning (Fraser 2001, 
29).                
 
Contemporary Debates about Recognition 
Within the last few decades, the discipline of political theory has witnessed a renewed 
interest in the role of recognition in political life. In the canon of political thought, the idea of 
recognition was originally derived from Hegel’s philosophical formulations about the “struggle 
for recognition” and the “dialectic of master and slave” in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 
Although several prominent theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century—George 
Herbert Mead, Karl Marx, and Charles H. Cooley, to name just a few— developed important 
analyses of recognition and its relationship to political and social life, the catalyst for the 
resurgent interest came with prominent philosopher Charles Taylor in the publication of his 
highly influential 1997 essay “The Politics of Recognition.” In this essay, Taylor argues that 
dominant cultures must recognize the worth of various minority cultures in a dialogical process 
of mutual recognition.1 Taylor’s conviction is based on the assumption that misrecognition 
                                                 
1
 Although I do not elaborate on this point, it is important to note that Taylor discusses two types of recognition 
demands: the “politics of universalism” asks us to recognize the universal dignity of all citizens, while the “politics 
of difference” demands that we recognize the distinct, particular identities of individuals and groups. According to 
Taylor, some versions of the politics of equal respect can be inhospitable to the politics of difference because the 
commitment to equal respect, he argues, is limited in liberal thought to the equal potential inherent in all human 
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(which often involves projecting an inferior or demeaning identity onto a minority group) is an 
act of oppression. To the extent that misrecognition saddles its victims with crippling self-hatred 
and low self-esteem, Taylor argues that “misrecognition has now graduated to the rank of a 
harm” (Taylor 1997, 121). In light of the damage wrought by misrecognition, therefore, Taylor 
insists that “due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a basic human need” 
(1997, 99).  
Taylor’s essay provoked an engaged and spirited debate within the field of political 
theory. Consequently, a cluster of loosely related formulations of the idea of recognition 
emerged to reinforce its centrality to much contemporary theorizing. Despite the important 
differences among disparate authors, Nancy Fraser concisely identifies the problem that many 
political theorists have attempted to solve through recognition: 
They contend that to belong to a group that is devalued by the dominant culture is 
to be misrecognized, to suffer a distortion of one’s realization to oneself… In this 
perspective, the politics of recognition aims to repair the internal self-dislocation 
by contesting the dominant culture’s demeaning picture of the group. It proposes 
that members of misrecognized groups reject such images in favour of new self-
representations of their own making, jettisoning internalized, negative identities 
and joining collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of their own… (Fraser 
2000, 110). 
 
Thus, she argues that whereas mainstream views of distributive justice have typically concerned 
themselves exclusively with the fair distribution goods—money, power, and opportunity— the 
renewed concern for recognition suggests that all people should be afforded the recognition of 
positively self-affirmed identities. 
Recently, several critics have argued that the pursuit for recognition should be abandoned 
as a political practice. Among them, Patchen Markell offers the most elaborate critique of 
                                                                                                                                                             
beings, but does not necessitate equal recognition of the accomplishments of human beings, as individuals or as 




recognition in the book Bound by Recognition. Drawing primarily from the democratic theories 
of Hannah Arendt and Ernesto Laclau, Markell argues that political pursuits for recognition are 
fundamentally misguided for several important reasons. First, Markell argues that the pursuit of 
recognition overlooks the reality that identity construction is an ongoing and unpredictable 
enterprise, achieved intersubjectively in an often incoherent world of meaning (Markell 2003, 
154). Appropriating Arendt’s formulations of plurality and action, Markell argues that the 
process disregards an important element of the human condition—finitude. Because our public 
identities are constituted in a context of plurality and indeterminacy, he argues, we cannot 
control how our identities will be perceived by others. In addition, Markell disagrees with 
Taylor’s assumption that action is dependent upon identity. Whereas Taylor maintains that we 
can only act once we know what is important to us, Markell argues that we cannot (and should 
not attempt to) achieve a coherent conception of a “doer” behind a “deed.” In sum, Markell 
argues that the political pursuit of recognition denies the open-ended and contingent nature of 
human interaction and mistakenly binds identity to action. If a radical “identity crisis” is 
politically paralyzing (as Taylor seems to suggest), Markell argues that an excessively firm grip 
on identity is paralyzing too. 
In place of a politics of recognition, Markell advocates a “politics of acknowledgement.” 
He succinctly outlines his creative project as follows:   
Acknowledgement is in the first instance self- rather than other- related; its object 
is not one’s own identity but one’s own basic or ontological condition or 
circumstances, particularly one’s own finitude; this finitude is to be understood as 
a matter of one’s own practical limits in the face of an unpredictable and 
contingent future, not as a matter of the impossibility or injustice of knowing 
others; and finally, acknowledgement involves coming to terms with, rather than 
vainly attempting to overcome, the risk, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and 
alienation that characterizes life among others (2003, 38). 
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In an effort to champion the politics of acknowledgment over the politics of recognition, Markell 
creatively offers a textual interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone. According to Markell, 
Sophocles’ Antigone stages a paradigmatic struggle for recognition. In his interpretation, he 
argues that the characters of Antigone and Creon attempt to achieve sovereign agency by acting 
on their understandings of who they are, and by demanding that others respect them on the basis 
of their self-declared “true identities” (2003, 69). Ultimately, Markell argues that Antigone’s act 
of disobedience (through the burial of her brother in spite of Creon’s edict to let Polyneices’ 
body lay unburied in disgrace) is an attempt to achieve the recognition of her identity as “sister” 
and “woman” (2003, 80). At the same time, Creon primarily self-identifies as a citizen and ruler, 
despite the fact he is also Polyneices’ uncle. He values the well-being of the polis over his duties 
towards family, for he treats Polyneices as ekthros (enemy) after the war. Furthermore, because 
Creon’s exclusively civic conception of philia is rigidly masculine, Antigone’s disobedience 
simultaneously misrecognizes his civic authority and threatens his masculinity (2003, 81).      
The main point that Markell wants to drive home through this interpretation is that 
Antigone and Creon’s actions (actions derived from identities) ironically undermine their 
commitments to the very self-identities that they hold dear. Although Antigone is willing to 
suffer death out of loyalty to a blood relative, she undermines her identification with her familial 
gender role by severing ties with Ismene and inappropriately appearing in civic spaces (2003, 
81). Likewise, Creon’s acts also undermine his own self-identifications. His pursuit of civic 
order turns him into a tyrant, and the death of his son Haemon forces him to effeminately mourn 
over his dead child (2003, 82). With respect to the central message of the tragedy, Markell 
writes, 
Part of the aim of (the) tragedy is to provoke in us an acknowledgment of action’s 
unpredictability and consequently also of the ineliminable possibility of suffering. 
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More deeply still, it teaches us that the attempt to become master of our own 
deeds and identity is not only doomed to fail, but risks intensifying that suffering 
unnecessarily, even demanding that we give our lives for what will turn out to be 
our illusion of control (2003, 65). 
  
According to Markell’s interpretation, Sophocles’ Antigone is a cautionary tale about the dangers 
of pursuing identity recognition in a context of plurality and indeterminacy. 
Overall, I agree with Markell’s assertion that Taylor’s pursuit of recognition is 
misguided. Although Taylor explicitly states that recognition occurs through a dialogical process 
of mutual recognition, I agree that by using recognition claims to demand that people recognize 
us for who we really are, he simultaneously invokes a conception of identity as a static, 
predetermined, and authentic.2 That said, I am equally dissatisfied with the politics of 
acknowledgement. Namely, I argue that Markell lacks an adequate analysis of power relations 
with respect to theories of identity construction. Because he does not pay attention to systematic 
patterns of “who gets paid attention to, what gets heard, and how” within a context of plurality 
(Bickford 1995, 318), his analysis does not fully consider the underlying power dynamics 
between subjects.  
In addition, by primarily focusing on the face-to-face dynamics of identity construction, 
Markell importantly overlooks the structural dynamics of power that often systematically impose 
ascriptive identities on embodied subjects through processes of cultural inscription. In the book 
Against Recognition, Louis McNay argues against what she calls the “fetishized indeterminacy” 
of Markell’s politics of acknowledgment (McNay 2008, 69). As McNay eloquently states, “…the 
assertion of a foundational indeterminacy does not go very far in unpacking the determinate 
                                                 
2
 Markell convincingly argues that Taylor simultaneously espouses two conflicting conceptions of identity through 
his formulations of recognition. On the one hand, Taylor equates recognition with “construction,” explicitly stating 
that identities are achieved in a dialogical process of mutual recognition. On the other hand, Markell rightly notes 
that Taylor also implicitly endorses a conception of recognition as “cognition,” which invokes identity as a 
predetermined “fact” awaiting our acknowledgement (2003, 58-59).             
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nature of many dimensions of social existence which pertain, in part, to the insidious operations 
of power on embodied subjects” (2008, 68).  
McNay’s persuasive critique of Markell’s politics of acknowledgement is largely 
indebted to the writings and appropriations of Michel Foucault. Rather than locating power 
completely within the individual acting subject, McNay adopts a social constructivist conception 
of power similar to the one articulated in the History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction. 
According to Foucault,  
Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their 
own organization: as the process which, through ceaseless struggle and 
confrontations, transforms, strengthens or even reverses them; as the support 
which these force relations find in one another; and lastly, as the strategies in 
which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various 
social hegemonies (Foucault 1990, 92). 
 
Under this definition, power is best understood as a relation. Foucault’s understanding of power 
is intimately connected with his conception of discourse. Drawing from several of Foucault’s 
most prominent works, feminist theorist Joan Scott offers a useful summary of a Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse. According to Scott’s reading of Foucault, a discourse is not a 
language or a text but a “historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of statements, 
terms, categories, and beliefs.” Discourse is thus “contained or expressed in organizations and 
institutions as well as in words” (Scott 1990, 136).           
 For example, Foucault understands “the gaze” to be a form of disciplinary power that is 
exercised within hegemonic discursive power structures. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
describes Bentham’s infamous panopticon as an architectural structure that allows prison guards 
to maintain constant visual control of prisoners. Designed using the principles of an optical 
system of control and domination, the panopticon allows the gaze to serve as a technology of 
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power in the production of docile bodies by allowing the prison guards to see while remaining 
unseen in return. Foucault’s analysis highlights the asymmetrical power relation between the 
“seer” (the subject) and the “seen” (the object). According to Foucault, the gaze is never simply a 
neutral act of vision—it is a sociocultural power regime taking place within discursive power 
structures. Furthermore, Foucault contends that the major achievement of the panopticon is “…to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power” (Foucault 1995, 201). Thus, the internalization of the gaze is the ultimate 
exercise of power.  
 If we contrast McNay’s and Foucault’s understanding of discourse to that of Taylor and 
Markell, we find that “discourse” is understood in profoundly different ways. Although Taylor 
and Markell do not explicitly define their use of the term “discourse,” I take them to mean it 
primarily as dialogue, conversation, and/or deliberation.3 At its most basic definition, discourse 
thus involves reasoning with others through language. In Against Recognition, McNay 
importantly critiques this understanding of discourse. Looking specifically at Taylor’s writings, 
she states that his theory of linguistic mediation invokes a “purified model of language where 
power relations are seen as extrinsic or secondary forms of distortion of the primal dyad of 
recognition” (2008, 62). She continues to critique this oversimplified understanding of discourse 
by arguing that “the setting up of language as prior to, rather than coeval with, power undermines 
(Taylor’s) claims to develop normative proposals that proceed from a sociological sensitivity to 
the situated and embodied nature of self” (2008, 62).  
Overall, I agree with McNay’s critique. Language is not secondary or “outside” of 
power—language is power. By highlighting these two different conceptions of discourse, I hope 
                                                 
3
 Although Taylor doesn’t define “discourse,” he states that language “is not just in the words we speak, but in other 
modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the ‘languages’ of art, of gesture, of love, and the like” 
(1997, 102).     
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to show that resistance to the social construction of demeaning identities cannot only be located 
in an individual’s right to participate in deliberation and discourse between subjects (using 
Taylor and Markell’s understanding of the term). Rather, resistance must also involve the 
resignification of meaning and the displacement of hegemonic meanings within discursive power 
structures through practices of deconstruction.    
To be clear, my adoption of a Foucaultian conception of power and discourse does not 
mean that I disregard the reality that identity construction also involves some degree of 
negotiation and conflict between subjects (see also McNay 2008, 169; Bickford 1996, 119). As I 
have already stated, I agree that identities are constructed intersubjectively in a context of 
plurality. However, language is not secondary to power—language is power. Thus, our identities 
are also to some degree constituted by our positioning and situatedness within language and 
discursive structures.  
As for Markell’s politics of acknowledgment, I also argue that he does not adequately 
focus on the fact that people often suffer psycho-emotional, social, and economic disadvantages 
under the imposition of demeaning identities. His inattention to the effects of an internalized, 
depreciated identity subsequently results in an unsatisfactory theory of agency and resistance. 
For instance, in his re-reading of Hegel’s account of the master-slave relation, Markell offers 
some limited insights about resistance:  
On Hegel’s account, identity-based social subordination is not fundamentally 
rooted in the failure of the powerful to notice some fact about the worth or value 
of the subordinated… Instead, these practices are rooted in the failure of the 
powerful to acknowledge something about themselves—specifically, in their 
failure to acknowledge, to bear the weight of, the fundamental human condition of 
finitude (2003, 112). 
  
As if the solution to the problem is simply to wait for privileged groups to acknowledge their 
vulnerability! Ultimately, waiting for oppressors to understand their vulnerability in the face of 
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human finitude may not appeal to individuals currently navigating the damaging, all-too-real 
effects of identity-based subordination.     
To sum up, I agree with Markell’s assertion that the social construction of identities is a 
continuous and indefinite enterprise, and that participating in processes of social construction 
does not mean that you always get what you want. However, I disagree with Markell’s tacit 
assumption that power is simply located within individuals and that language is secondary to 
power. This assumption results in an incomplete portrait of the social construction of identities. 
Likewise, Markell does not take seriously the psycho-emotional, social, and economic 
disadvantages wrought by the social construction of demeaning identities. The politics of 
acknowledgment subsequently fails to offer an adequate theory of resistance. 
 At the end of this thesis, I will champion an alternative version of the politics of 
recognition that can adequately account for my aforementioned critiques that is largely inspired 
by the work of Nancy Fraser. Before I endorse an alternative, however, I want to offer a textual 
analysis of another tragedy in order to better understand what is at stake in political struggles for 
recognition. Whereas Markell provided a textual interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone to 
discredit political the pursuit of recognition, I turn to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in order to re-
conceptualize recognition and propose an alternative framework to both Taylor’s politics of 
recognition and Markell’s politics of acknowledgment.  
At first glance, Frankenstein may appear to be an unlikely source. However, I read 
Frankenstein as an exemplary tale of the struggle for recognition. Over the course of the novel, 
the reader is invited to explore the ways Victor Frankenstein’s Creature, his famous “Monster,” 
attempts to “un-monster” himself by demanding that the other characters in the novel recognize 
his self-identity as a “kind and feeling friend” (F 1994, 95). Ultimately, the tragedy of 
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Frankenstein is that the not-so-monstrous Creature cannot see himself as anything other than a 
monster—he is never afforded the recognition he so desperately desires. In contrast to Markell, 
however, I argue that the Creature’s failure to resist the identity of “monster” is not primarily a 
result of the human condition of finitude. Rather, I argue that the Creature cannot single-
handedly overcome the asymmetrical power relations that both underlie the social construction 
of his identity as monster and are reinforced through his imposed location within hegemonic 
discourses of corporeal normality.    
The tragedy of Frankenstein may be more relevant to contemporary debates about 
recognition than Sophocles’ Antigone because it was written during an historical epoch when our 
contemporary understanding of recognition was being developed. According to Taylor, the new 
ideal of an “authentic identity” (an identity demanding recognition) was one outcome of the 
decline of hierarchal societies during the eighteenth century. Taylor maintains that in earlier 
societies, what we would now call identity was largely fixed by one’s social position. In contrast 
to conceptions of identity in pre-modernity, the advent of democratic societies and the increasing 
time-space compression of the modern era created a social context ripe for new forms of identity 
construction (1997, 104). Given the historical specificity of the concept of recognition, it is 
important to briefly situate Frankenstein in biographical and historical context. 
  
Mary Shelley and the World She Inhabited: 
A Brief Biographical and Historical Background 
 
When nineteen-year-old Mary Shelley wrote a story to “curdle the blood, and quicken the 
beatings of the heart” in the summer of 1816, she could never have foreseen the lasting 
impression Frankenstein would leave on the modern social imaginary (F, vii). One need only flip 
on the television in October to confirm its power over the modern mind. Numerous academic 
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disciplines— literature, history, sociology, critical race studies, and political theory, among 
others— have yielded diverse interpretations of Frankenstein. Moreover, within these 
disciplines, many scholars have studied the rich themes embedded in the text: the dangers of 
overreaching and pursuing knowledge at all costs (O’Rourke 1989); the use and value of 
language (Bugg 2006); the importance of family and parenthood (Carlson 2007); the trope of 
physical difference (Davis 1995; Malchow 1993; Gigante 2000; Mossman 2007), and others.  
Several scholars have focused particular attention on Shelley herself, the self-proclaimed 
“daughter of two persons of literary celebrity” (F, v). These writers argue that it is difficult to 
thoroughly understand the larger implications of Shelley’s novel unless we put it on conversation 
with Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin’s lives and publications. For instance, U.C. 
Knoepflmacher persuasively argues that Frankenstein is an expression of Shelley’s adolescent 
anger over her parentage, especially over her irresponsible father who often neglected his 
children in order to pursue professional and political ambitions (Knoepflmacher 1979, 39). 
Similarly, Ellen Moers argues that Frankenstein evolved out of Shelley’s own tragic experience 
as an unwed mother of a baby who only survived a few weeks. According to Moers’ 
interpretation, Frankenstein both discloses Shelley’s personal anxieties about childbirth and 
motherhood and also reveals Shelley’s guilt for having caused her own mother’s death (Moers 
1979, 77). In the end, Moers suggests that the novel should be read as a “horror story of 
maternity” (1979, 95). Finally, in England’s First Family of Writers, Julie Carlson also argues 
that life and literature were inseparable in the daily lives of Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Shelley. 
One of the central claims of Carlson’s book is that not only are their writings and lives 
inextricably intertwined, but that their professional and personal goals included “blurring the 
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boundaries between person and text, private and public, living and writing, works of literature 
and works of mourning” (2007, 3).        
As Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s daughter and renowned poet Percy Shelley’s wife, Mary 
Shelley undoubtedly confronted several challenges to self-definition. The “infamy” of her family 
legacy, resulting from Wollstonecraft and Godwin’s unorthodox personal lives and radical 
philosophies, not only cast a wide shadow for Mary in radical intellectual circles but also 
exposed her to the hardships of endless gossip and public scrutiny from conservative enclaves. 
Thus, Shelley undoubtedly faced difficulties carving out an intellectual voice in the face of her 
radical intellectual inheritance (Carlson 2007, 247).  
Shelley also lived outside the conventional expectations of white, middle-class 
womanhood in early nineteenth century England. In 1814, when Mary was just sixteen years old, 
she fell in love with Percy Shelley, who was a married man at the time. That summer, Mary and 
her step-sister Claire Clairmont fled to France with Percy. On their return to England, Mary was 
pregnant with Shelley’s first child, who would later die prematurely. Percy and Mary married in 
1816 after Percy’s wife Harriet committed suicide. In addition to the scandal surrounding 
Shelley’s personal life, she also faced obstacles to autonomous authorship simply by virtue of 
her gender identity. In The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, literary scholar Mary Poovey 
argues that in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century European society female authorship 
jeopardized modesty and transgressed gender boundaries by calling attention to “…the woman as 
subject, as initiator of direct action, as a person deserving of notice for her own sake” (Poovey 
1984, 36). If Poovey is right, social constructions of femininity in early nineteenth century 
Britain may explain why Frankenstein was originally published anonymously in 1818. Building 
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off of Poovey’s analysis, Shelley’s Frankenstein can be read as Shelley’s “monstrous” desire for 
autonomous authorship in the face of dominant gender norms of female propriety (1984, 46).    
Moving beyond Shelley’s personal “identity crisis,” we see that the historical epoch in 
which Shelley was born was generally characterized by rapid change, expanding understandings 
of the world under colonialism, and challenges to tradition and hierarchical power structures. 
However, the dissolution of feudalism, the Enlightenment project of human perfectability and 
universality, and the ideological pluralism of the epoch all provoked a political and ideological 
backlash towards the end of the eighteenth century, especially after the unfavorable outcome of 
the French Revolution. Placing Frankenstein in its social and historical context, historian H.L 
Malchow importantly notes that Mary Shelley grew to maturity in a highly charged political and 
intellectual atmosphere, during a time when revolutionary radicalism was under attack by an 
increasingly vocal conservative polemic (1993, 94).          
The conservative political era Shelley inhabited as a young writer witnessed the 
emergence of a dominant discourse in which the body surfaced as a site of social, political, and 
moral identity. As literary scholar Lennard Davis argues, it was during this era that the body 
came to be viewed as the external manifestation of an internal “self.” To prove his point, Davis 
examines the advent of statistics, claiming that statistical analyses were a manifestation of 
modernity’s new need to regulate bodies and attach normative judgments to particular physical 
attributes. According to Davis, French statistician Adolphe Quetlet (1796- 1847) developed the 
concept of l’homme moyen—“the average man.” Quetlet’s l’homme moyen was a combination of 
l’homme moyen physique and l’homme moyen morale, meaning that the average man was both a 
physical and moral construct. In turn, physical attributes such as weight, height, and skin 
complexion were ascribed with moral, social, and political worth. Ultimately, Davis’s point is 
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that in formulating the idea of l’homme moyen, the physical became tied to a more fully 
articulated conception of the internal self. Davis’s historical analysis not only accounts for the 
reason why scientific arguments about “nature” increasingly informed social theory during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but also shows how the physical and the moral became 
intimately intertwined (Davis 1997, 26-30).  
Although contemporary revisionist histories explain how the external body increasingly 
operated as a marker of identity in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe4, one need go no 
further than the writings of many political thinkers of the time to ascertain the ways in which 
physical characteristics functioned as markers of internal moral worth. For instance, philosopher 
David Hume celebrates the inborn superiority of the white race in his essay, “Of National 
Characters” (1742): 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all other species of men (there are 
four or five different kinds), to be naturally inferior to the whites. There was never 
a civilized nation of any other complexion than white… Such a uniform and 
constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had 
not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men (Quoted from Bugg 
2006, 662). 
 
In this passage, Hume’s defense of the superiority (coded as civilization) of the European man is 
founded upon the distinction of physical attributes between human beings, which he assumes are 
markers of “naturally” inferior characteristics. As we know from the larger body of his writings, 
Hume used this differentiation to advocate the expansion of colonialism. In fact, this emerging 
discourse about the relationship between the body and identity was often used to justify and 
perpetuate practices of social and political inequality: if one assumes that the external body is a 
physical marker of an internal identity, it is convenient to devalue particular bodily attributes (the 
                                                 
4
 H.L Malchow and Anne Fausto-Sterling’s revisionist histories confirm that eighteenth century Europe witnessed 
the construction of moral, social, and political identities based on physical attributes (see Malchow 1993, 96; Fausto-




assumed markers of an internal moral inferiority) in order to preserve and perpetuate relations to 
dominance/submission.          
 This emerging discourse about identity not only existed when Frankenstein was 
published, but it was also commonly used to justify and perpetuate practices of inequality. I am 
not suggesting that Shelley necessarily read Hume’s work; no causal relationship is implied. 
However, I do suggest that Shelley’s insights about identity and physical difference reflect and 
react to the discussions of identity taking place at the time. As I mentioned earlier, several 
scholars interpret the Creature as a signifier of corporeal difference (Davis 1995; Malchow 1993; 
Gigante 2000; Mossman 2007). Whereas Lennard Davis and Mark Mossman convincingly 
interpret the Creature as a signifier of physical disability, H.L Malchow draws comparisons 
between Shelley’s Frankenstein and contemporary writings and images of race and slavery in 
early nineteenth century England. While I find their arguments persuasive, I resist claiming that 
the Creature is specifically racialized or disabled, per se; I am satisfied with the basic assertion 
that the Creature is an aberrant signifier of corporeal difference. Keeping this in mind, the 
ensuing textual analysis of the social construction of the Creature’s identity as monster attempts 
to highlight how discursive power structures of corporeal normality often systematically impose 
ascriptive identities on embodied subjects through processes of cultural inscription.   
 
Shelley’s Frankenstein: The Social Construction of Identity 
 
In this the direct moral of the book consists; and it is perhaps the most important, and of the most 
universal application of any moral that can be enforced by example. Treat a person ill, and he 
will become wicked. Requite affection with scorn;—let one being be selected, for whatever 
cause, as the refuse of his kind—divide him, a social being, from society, and you impose upon 
him the irresistible obligations—malevolence and selfishness. It is thus that, too often in society, 
those who are best qualified to be its benefactors and its ornaments, are branded…with scorn, 
and changed by neglect and solitude of heart, into a scourge and a curse.  
 
      -Percy Shelley, 1818, Review of Frankenstein  
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This passage is an explicit statement of what both Percy and Mary Shelley regarded as 
one of the central intended messages of the book. Assuming that individuals are products of their 
social environments, Percy Shelley claims that if you “treat a person ill…he will become 
wicked” (Quoted in St. Clair 2000, 40-41). Much like Taylor and Markell, Mary Shelley denies 
ontological individualism, or the notion that selves can achieve identity outside the social 
domain. However, Shelley’s Frankenstein also reveals the ways in which processes of cultural 
inscription— particularly the operation of the gaze— constitute the character of the Creature as 
“monster,” “fiend,” “daemon,” and “devil.” In other words, Shelley demonstrates that even 
though identities are socially constructed in a context of plurality, ascriptive identities are often 
produced at one remove from direct dialogue through discursive technologies of power. As a 
result, Shelley’s insights about the social construction of identity not only challenged the 
emerging discourses of the body and identity in eighteenth and early nineteenth century England; 
they also inform contemporary debates about the politics of recognition.   
 When referring to social construction, I adopt Nancy Hirschmann’s “three level” 
conception as outlined in the book The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of 
Freedom. According to Hirschmann, level one of social construction is the “ideological 
misrepresentation of reality” (Hirschmann 2003, 77). At this level, social construction is taken to 
mean something artificially and purposively constructed in a way that obfuscates “true” reality. 
Applying the first level of social construction directly to Frankenstein, Shelley reveals how the 
assumption that the external body is a manifestation of an internal self is a misrepresentation of 
reality. Over the course of the novel, Shelley deconstructs the supposedly natural relationship 
between corporeality and identity by highlighting the divide between the Creature’s internal 
values and sense-of-self and the externally imposed identity of monster. Our ability to analyze 
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how the Creature’s internal self does not match his identity as monster is made possible by the 
unique narrative format of the text, which is divided among three narrators: Captain Robert 
Walton, Victor Frankenstein, and the Creature. Through the Creature’s narrative, the reader is 
able to move beyond the Creature’s monstrous hideousness (as described by the Walton and 
Frankenstein) to see how he considers himself as a being who exudes an innate goodness, a 
desire to learn, and an inherent sociability. Similarly, the reader is also able to discover the 
divide between Victor Frankenstein’s external appearance as normative—an educated, middle-
class, male European— and his internal struggles with inner daemons.          
Hirschmann labels the second level of social construction materialization, wherein the 
misrepresentation of reality produces material effects (2003, 79). At this level, social 
construction moves from the misrepresentation of reality to the material creation of the social 
phenomena it describes. As it applies to Frankenstein, Shelley effectively illustrates how the 
misrepresentation of reality materializes into a social hierarchy predicated upon corporeal 
difference by detailing the Creature’s miserable fate of psycho-emotional distress, social 
exclusion, and economic poverty. Scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson labels this hierarchy the 
“politics of appearance”5, whereby the body serves as “the coordinates of a taxonomical system 
that distributes status, privilege, and material goods to a hierarchy anchored by visible human 
physical variation” (Garland-Thomson 1997, 135). The second level of social construction is 
particularly salient because it reminds us that the normative goals of Taylor’s politics of 
recognition are worth pursuing. Although the demeaning identity of monster is socially 
                                                 
5
 In Extraordinary Bodies, Rosemarie-Garland Thomson analyzes cultural representations of disability in nineteenth 
century American literature, and she claims that by focusing on cultural representations of disability she discovers a 
politics of appearance in which some physical “…traits, configurations, and functions become the stigmata of a 
vividly embodied inferiority or difference, while others fade into a neutral, disembodied, universalized norm” (135). 
While I do not claim that the Creature is disabled, per se, Garland-Thomson’s methodology undoubtedly influenced 




constructed, Shelley reminds her readers that social construction materializes into real and 
occasionally detrimental consequences that require political intervention.     
Lastly, Hirschmann calls the third level of social construction “the discursive 
construction of social meaning” (2003, 81). Appropriating Foucault’s conception of discourse, 
this third level demonstrates how discursive structures actually constitute subjectivities. Because 
nobody is “outside” of language, an analysis of the discursive construction of social meaning 
also reveals how “excluded others” participate to varying degrees in social construction. Turning 
to the character development of the Creature, Shelley reveals how the Creature’s identity is 
constituted through his positioning within language, and she highlights how discourses of 
corporeal normality are reinforced through the operation of the gaze. Also, the direct exchanges 
between the Creature and Victor show how the dialogical construction of identity is played out in 
a context of inequality. An analysis of the third level of social construction reinforces my central 
critique of Taylor and Markell. Although I agree that identities are partially produced 
intersubjectively, I also argue that attention to the structural dynamics of power underlying 
processes of social construction will reveal a loose pattern to social construction and lay bare the 
often “determinate nature of many dimensions of social existence which pertain…to the 
insidious operations of power upon embodied subjects” (McNay 2008, 68). The following 
sections elaborate on the three levels of social construction as they relate to the character 
development of the Creature as monster. From this interpretation, I hope to show that we cannot 
judge the relative merit of particular conceptions of recognition without first understanding how 
oppressive groups have the power to define the oppressed.6 
                                                 
6
 The following summary provides a useful overview of how Hirschmann understands the “three levels” of social 
construction: “Level three reveals the depth of social construction, that it is not simply a superficial socialization 
process but takes place in our very language, epistemology and ways of understanding our identity. But levels one 
and two link discursive understandings to the physical, visceral reality of oppression. One should imagine ‘levels’ in 
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The Misrepresentation of Reality 
Frankenstein is composed of a series of letters that recount Captain Robert Walton’s 
journey for the North Pole to his sister, Mrs. Saville. While the first three letters detail the 
success of Walton’s mission at sea, the fourth letter describes how the mission is soon 
interrupted by “vast and irregular plains of ice” (F, 8). Trapped in the frozen water, Walton 
encounters Victor Frankenstein as he travels across the ice on a dog-drawn sledge in pursuit of 
the Creature. In this opening scene, Walton first describes the physical attributes of the Victor 
and the Creature by juxtaposing “European” and “savage” physical attributes. When describing 
Victor, he writes, “He (Victor Frankenstein) was not as the other traveler seemed to be, a savage 
inhabitant of some undiscovered island, but a European” (F, 8-9). From the outset, the reader is 
invited to understand the “savage” as distinct from the person who looks like a “European” (F, 
8). 
Next, Captain Walton takes the nearly-frozen and emaciated Victor aboard his ship and 
nurses him back to health. After Victor recovers, he discloses the tale of his life to Walton, who 
records Victor’s story in a manuscript addressed to Mrs. Saville. This manuscript allows the 
reader to hear Victor’s first-person narrative (F, 14). At the beginning of his tale, Victor 
describes his blissful childhood in Geneva and romanticizes his relationships with his family and 
friends, most notably his adopted sister Elizabeth Lavenza and his best friend Henry Clerval. 
Later, Victor confesses that after he moved away from home to attend the University of 
Ingolstadt in order to study natural philosophy and chemistry, his insatiable curiosity and 
ambition feverishly drove him to attempt to “bestow animation upon lifeless matter” by 
                                                                                                                                                             
quotation marks, however, because the three are not distinct processes, one leading to the next in linear fashion. 
Rather the three dimensions are intricately interdependent” (2003, 89 emphasis added).    
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fashioning a creature out of dead body parts (F, 32). As his creation comes to life, he describes 
its appearance as follows:        
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of his muscles and arteries beneath; his 
hair was of lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness, but these 
luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed 
almost the same colour of the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his 
shriveling complexion and straight back lips (F, 35). 
   
Upon seeing his creation, Victor declares that “breathless horror and disgust filled my heart” (F, 
35). Furthermore, he quickly attaches normative adjectives to the Creature’s character, using 
terms such as “miserable” and “wretched” to describe his creation well before he has stirred. 
Thus, the Creature’s unusual physical attributes are immediately coded with value judgments—
judgments that precede the Creature’s use of language or behavior towards others. In this way, 
the Creature is assumed to be monstrous because of the way he looks— not as a result of his 
actions.  
 Thus far, the novel is aligned with the assumption that the external body was a physical 
manifestation of an internal “self.” However, the first-person narrative of the Creature challenges 
this view by revealing the divide between the Creature’s own sense of self and the externally 
imposed identity of “monster.” The Creature’s first-person narrative is introduced in the novel 
after Victor has already relayed the following sequence of events to Walton: after the Creature 
escapes from Victor’s apartment, Victor receives a letter from his father informing him that his 
youngest brother, William, has been murdered (F, 46-47). When Victor rushes home to console 
his family after the murder, he catches sight of the Creature in the woods and rightfully suspects 
the Creature to be the murderer (F, 50). Meanwhile, a family friend named Justine Moritz is 
wrongfully accused, convicted, and executed for the murder of William (F, 54-57). Throughout 
this sequence of events, Victor feels immensely remorseful that his creation has killed two loved 
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ones. He journeys on horseback to the mountains in order to escape his grief and guilt only to be 
approached by the Creature, who is desperate to present his side of the story. At this point, the 
narrative format of the novel is complete: the Creature speaks though Victor’s narrative to 
Walton, and Walton ultimately serves as the scribe of Frankenstein.       
 The Creature’s narrative begins with his flight from Victor’s apartment into the 
wilderness. He takes refuge in a hovel constructed of wood in an area near some cottagers, who 
come to be known as the De Lacey family. As we are exposed to the Creature’s inner thoughts 
and feelings, we come to realize that he is not so monstrous after all.  For example, after he reads 
a copy of Plutarch’s Lives that he found on the ground outside of the De Lacey home, he 
describes his reaction to the novel, stating that “I read of men concerned in public affairs… I felt 
the greatest ardour for virtue rise within me, and abhorrence for vice” (F, 92). Furthermore, he 
explicitly declares his admiration of peace (F, 92), gushes over the values family and community 
(F, 86), and laments the injustice of poverty (F, 85). Likewise, he exhibits admirable moral 
sentiments, such as sympathy (F, 91), love and reverence (F, 86), and curiosity and intelligence 
(F, 85).      
In a similar way, Shelley complicates the identity of Victor Frankenstein. Although the 
reader is initially invited to identify with the man who appears to be an educated, middle-class, 
European, we come to see that a monster lives within Victor. After the death of William and the 
conviction of Justine, Victor states: 
I wandered like an evil spirit, for I had committed deeds of mischief beyond 
description horrible…I was seized by remorse and the sense of guilt, which 
hurried me away to a hell of intense tortures… (F, 61). 
    
Thus, the man who appears normal on the outside actually experiences inner daemons. This point 
is further articulated in his confession that “I…was the true murderer” (F, 63). Hence, 
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Frankenstein’s self-identity as an atrocious murderer also complicates the connection between 
his exterior body and his internal identity, further exposing the “misrepresentation of realty.”  
 
 The Materialization of a Misrepresented Reality 
 
Shelley’s formulation quickly moves beyond an analysis of the misrepresentation of 
reality. Over the course of the novel, every character suffers the negative consequences of the 
social construction of the identity of monster. Most notably, the Creature endures psycho-
emotional distress, exclusion from social life and equal participation in the arrangement of 
human affairs, and economic poverty. Several passages capture the Creature’s feelings of self-
hatred and misery: “I abhorred myself; (F, 164); “I am miserable” (F, 104); “Everywhere I see 
bliss, from which alone I am irrevocably excluded” (F, 69). In these passages and others like 
them, we confront the psycho-emotional damage wrought through the internalization of a 
demeaning identity. Several proponents of recognition, including James Tully, have focused on 
the psycho-emotional effects of such misrecognition. These scholars claim that devalued 
identities undermine an individual’s self-respect and self-esteem, which enable the individual to 
develop the autonomy necessary to participate equally in public and private life (Tully 2000, 
470; see also Honneth 1995). Shelley supports this formulation. The Creature repeatedly 
discusses his desire to participate in social life, but his fears of being misrecognized in the public 
sphere prevent him from doing so: “I longed to join them (people),” confesses the Creature, “but 
I dared not” (F, 77). 
After the Creature becomes aware of his corporeal difference, he states that “I did not 
know yet the fatal effects of this miserable deformity” (F, 80). In this passage, the Creature 
expresses foresight into his unjust fate of exclusion, isolation, and poverty that results from his 
position at the bottom of the social hierarchy. In a moment of self-pity, he implicitly reveals his 
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understanding of the politics of appearance when he states, “I possessed no money, no friends, 
no kind of property. I was besides, endued with a figure hideously deformed and loathsome…” 
(F, 85). In this way, the Creature recognizes that his body traps him in a snare of abnormality 
that impedes his acceptance into society.   
In the face of these material effects, the Creature toothlessly grapples with the 
consequences of the misrepresentation of reality by attempting to “pass,” which involves 
adopting the characteristics of the oppressor in order to cope with a stigmatized identity (see 
Goffman 1963, 73-77). The theme of “passing” is fully developed through the Creature’s 
acquisition of language: 
I easily perceived that, although I eagerly longed to discover myself to the 
cottagers, I ought not to make the attempt until I had first become master of their 
language; which knowledge might enable me to make them overlook the 
deformity of my figure (F, 80). 
 
Shelley also touches on passing when she refers to Aesop’s fable of the ass and the lap-dog. 
According to the fable, a donkey foolishly attempts to adopt the mannerisms of the beloved lap-
dog in order to win the affection of their master. The moral of the story is that unworthy people 
should not try to usurp the position of their superiors. However, the Creature challenges this 
fable when he states that “It was as the ass and the lap-dog; yet surely the gentle ass whose 
intentions were affectionate, although his manners were rude, deserved better treatment than 
blows and excursions” (F, 81). From this, we can infer that the Creature hoped to be rewarded 
for his conformity and be allowed to pass as human if he adopts all of the characteristics of 
human beings.      
 However, the Creature does not suffer the negative consequences of misrepresented 
reality alone.  After repeatedly enduring the hardships of the identity monster, the Creature gives 
up on passing. Eventually, the Creature is constituted as monster and begins to commit 
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monstrous acts. We see this change in the Creature’s character after he has been rejected from 
the De Lacey family: “I, like the arch-fiend, bore a hell within me; and, finding myself 
unsympathized with, wished to tear up the trees, spread havoc and destruction around me, and 
then to have sat down and enjoyed the ruin” (F, 97). In the timeline of the novel, the Creature’s 
consciousness of his position as the bottom of the social hierarchy and his experiences of 
exclusion and poverty precede all of his monstrous acts. The Creature kills his first victim, 
William, only after his refuge in the woods and his full realization of his own rejection. In turn, 
William’s murder incites the murder of Justine, who was falsely accused of killing William. 
Later, the Creature vengefully kills Frankenstein’s beloved friend Henry Clerval, followed his 
bride Elizabeth on their bridal bed. In response to these monstrous acts, the Creature insists, “I 
was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend” (F, 69). In a similar passage, he claims that 
“My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor” (F, 106).  
In effect, the social construction of the identity of monster comes full circle. The 
Creature’s corporeal attributes are coded with negative value judgments, and his hideous external 
attributes are assumed to reflect his internal monstrous self. Over the course of the novel, we see 
that the discourse about the relationship between the body and identity becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.    
 
The Discursive Construction of Identity 
 
Thus far we have seen how the first two levels of social construction operate in the text: 
the Creature’s body is assumed to reflect his internal monstrous self, and this false representation 
actually constitutes the Creature as monster. Furthermore, the materialization of the Creature’s 
identity as monster results in the Creature’s sad fate of isolation, poverty, and psycho-emotional 
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distress, and all of the other characters in the novel must deal with the effects of his monstrous 
actions after he has been constituted as such. In this section, I pay close attention to the ways that 
discourse constitutes the Creature as monster. What I find to be particularly interesting about 
Shelley’s insights into discursive identity production is her strategic use of the words “normal” 
and “deformity.” If we pay close attention to the way she describes judgments about normality 
and deformity, we see that she implies that our judgments about this distinction are learned and 
socially contingent. For example, before the Creature kills William, the following thought passes 
through his mind: 
An idea seized me that this little creature (William) was unprejudiced, and had 
lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of deformity. If therefore, I could 
seize him and educate him as my companion friend, I should not be so desolate on 
this peopled earth (F, 102, emphasis added).  
 
This passage supposes that children learn to demarcate normality from deformity within 
discursive structures of corporeal normality.   
In addition, Shelley details the role that vision—the gaze—plays in social construction. 
At the beginning of his narrative, the Creature describes his experience with a group of villagers 
in the wilderness as he attempts to enter their garden. In this account, he states that, “I had hardly 
placed my foot within the door before the children shrieked, and one of the women fainted” (F, 
74). The Creature wrongly assumed that the villagers reacted adversely because of his actions, 
and he ponders what he did wrong. He racks his brain to “endeavor the motives that influenced 
their (the villagers’) response” (F, 77). Little did he know, the mere sight of his body provoked 
the adverse reaction. This initial experience with human beings is followed by a more telling 
encounter with the father of the De Lacey family, who is blind. One day the Creature finds the 
courage to approach Mr. De Lacey in an attempt to befriend him once the rest of the family has 
left the home. His interaction with the old blind man is positive until the rest of the De Lacey 
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family returns to discover them, striking out at the Creature in fear and horror before he can 
explain his intentions. 
The point that Shelley stresses is that the gaze occludes dialogue. Going back to the 
villagers’ reaction to his appearance, the Creature says that “some fled, some attacked me, until 
grievously bruised by stones and other kinds of missile weapons, I escaped” (F, 74). Likewise, 
when the other members of the De Lacey family—Felix, Safie, and Agatha— came home and 
saw the Creature conversing with their blind father, the Creature states that “Agatha fainted; and 
Safie, unable to attend to her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward, and with 
supernatural force tore me from their father, to whose knees I clung” (F, 97). Thus, the Creature 
is not only constituted as monster because everyone who sees him points a finger and 
dialogically declares “you are a monster.” Rather, the Creature is situated within a discursive 
field of corporeal normality, in which the gaze strips him of his capacity to engage with others in 
a process of mutual recognition.    
In fact, the only opportunity the Creature has for self-definition is during his brief 
conversation with Mr. De Lacey, since De Lacey’s blindness creates a window for the Creature 
to express himself free from the “tyranny of vision”:      
I have good dispositions; my life has been hitherto harmless and in some degree 
beneficial; but a fatal prejudice clouds their eyes, and where they ought to see a 
feeling and kind friend, they behold only a detestable monster (F, 95, emphasis 
added). 
 
The fact that the Creature’s only positive interaction with a human being is with a blind man 
suggests that the Creature may have had a better chance to achieve a more human identity had he 
lived in a world where vision did not regulate and discipline bodies to conform to hegemonic 
discourses of corporeal normality.  
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Not only does the gaze occlude dialog, as Shelley skillfully demonstrates, but it also 
reinforces the asymmetrical power relations between the subjects of the gaze (the “seers,” i.e. the 
villagers and the De Lacey family) and the object of the gaze (the “seen,” i.e. the Creature). 
These asymmetrical power relations are further entrenched after the Creature internalizes his 
identity as “monster.” As the Creature looks into the pool of water, he states, 
How I was terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I started 
back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and 
when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster I am, I was filled 
with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification (F, 80).  
 
Hence, it is clear that Shelley understood how the dominant discourse of corporeal normality 
hampered the Creature’s ability to fully participate in processes of mutual recognition.        
That said, Shelley still acknowledges that the Creature (as “excluded other”) participates 
in the social construction of his identity to some degree. In Hirschmann’s understanding of social 
construction, she maintains that “we are all constituted and constituting, simultaneously at once” 
(2003, 83). The dialogical exchanges between the Creature and Victor imply that Shelley would 
agree. Yet Shelley repeatedly draws our attention to the unequal power relations between the 
actors. Looking at the first conversation between Victor and the Creature, Victor yells, “Begone! 
I will not hear you. There can be no community between you and me.” The Creature directly 
replies with the following plea: 
Let your passion be moved, and do not disdain me. Listen to my tale: when you 
have heard that, abandon or commiserate me, as you shall judge that I deserve. 
But hear me…I ask you not to spare me: listen to me; and then, if you can, and if 
you will, destroy the work of your hands (F, 69, emphases added).   
 
This plea strikes me in two ways. First, the Creature is more concerned with the process 
of judgment more than the outcome. He is desperate to be an equal participant in the 
intersubjective construction of his identity. Second, he knows that his ability to sculpt his identity 
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is tied to Victor’s receptivity, since Victor is not disadvantaged by his externally imposed 
identity, having been granted his status as human. The Creature highlights the unequal power 
relations between subjects when he concedes to Victor: “On you it rests, whether I quit forever 
the neighborhood of man and lead a harmless life…” (F, 70, emphasis added).  
 Ultimately, Victor does not affirm the Creature’s recognition claims. Subsequently the 
ultimate tragedy of Frankenstein is that the Creature is never able to see himself as anything 
other than a monster. One could easily attribute the tragedy of Frankenstein to Markell’s 
conclusion that we cannot and should not attempt to control the reactions and perceptions of 
other individuals in a context of plurality, for any attempt “to become master of our… identity is 
not only doomed to fail, but risks intensifying the suffering unnecessarily” (Markell 2003, 65). 
However, Markell’s appropriation of Arendt overlooks patterns of “who gets paid attention to, 
what gets heard, and how” within a context of plurality (Bickford 1995, 318). In contrast, Susan 
Bickford’s analysis of the relationship between plurality and identity makes an important 
distinction “between being stereotyped or being otherwise not-heard (a kind of tension that is 
antipolitical) and being heard differently than we want to be” (Bickford 1995, 328). This 
distinction between being stereotyped and being heard differently than one wants to be draws our 
attention to the ways in which positively self-affirmed identities can be thwarted by dominant 
discourses and stereotypes.  
According to my reading, the Creature’s demand for recognition does not fail because he 
is heard differently than he wants to be, as Markell might suggest. In fact, Victor admits that “I 
was moved… I felt there was some justice is his (the Creature’s) argument. His tale, and the 
feelings he now expressed, proved him to be a creature of fine sensations” (F, 105). Instead, 
Victor cannot bring himself to admit what was otherwise obvious. In his own words: 
31 
 
I compassionated him (the Creature)…but when I looked upon him, when I saw 
this filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened and my feelings were 
altered to those of horror and hatred (F, 106). 
 
Thus I argue that the Creature’s appeals do not work because Victor is unable to think outside of 
the constructs of hegemonic discourses of corporeal normality. In short, Victor cannot move 
beyond his preconceived stereotypes of what a monster is. 
For his part, the Creature cannot participate on equal footing in dialogue as a result of the 
material inequalities wrought by his identity as “monster.” Not only does Victor not actively 
listen to the Creature, but the Creature is all-too-aware that he is dependent upon Victor. For 
example, in his pleas for companionship the Creature cries, “You must create a female for me, 
with whom I can live in interchange of those sympathies necessary for my being. This you alone 
can do” (F, 104, emphasis added). The Creature knows that he lacks the social capital, education, 
and economic security to achieve this goal by himself. 
   
Lessons from the Tragedy of Frankenstein: 
Re-conceptualizing the Politics of Recognition 
 
If the tragedy of Frankenstein is that the Creature cannot see himself as anything other 
than a monster, what are we supposed to learn from the tale? How, exactly, does Frankenstein 
inform contemporary debates about the role of recognition in political life? First, the miserable 
fate of the Creature reminds political theorists who are dedicated to social justice that we cannot 
overlook the fact that the social construction of demeaning identities unjustly forces members of 
devalued groups to navigate psycho-emotional, social, and economic hardships. Whereas 
Markell suggests that we should simply abandon pursuits of recognition and accept “the 
ineliminable possibility of suffering” (2003, 65), the tragedy of Frankenstein alerts us to the fact 
that we have a democratic responsibility to address the systemic social inequalities that impede 
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members of devalued groups from achieving participatory equality in public life. Although I 
cannot fully explore this point here, I find it remarkable that Shelley’s Frankenstein focuses on 
the informal impediments to participation, given that the novel was written in era when the 
majority of women, people of color, and propertyless workers faced a variety of formal barriers 
to participation, including the denial of basic right to vote.  
Furthermore, the tragedy reminds us that even though the social construction of 
demeaning identities is detrimental to members of devalued groups, members of devalued groups 
cannot simply demand that other people recognize their self-affirmed identities, since we cannot 
control other people’s reactions to our actions and speech. After all, because social construction 
requires some perpetual conflict and negotiation on the part of actors, participation does not 
necessarily mean that you get what you want. Therefore any viable alternative to Taylor’s 
politics of recognition should abandon the pursuit of recognition within the framework of 
distributive justice and embrace an understanding rooted in the paradigm of procedural justice. 
Accordingly, recognition is not a good that we owe people, since the concept of a good implies 
fixity. Rather, recognition involves acknowledging the fact that we participate unevenly in 
processes of social construction. In the words of Nancy Hirschmann,       
Acknowledging the disparities in powers of production and creation within the 
processes of social construction allows us to identify, locate, and name the ways 
in which oppressive groups have the power to define the oppressed…While 
recognizing that we all participate in social construction, identifying disparities in 
this process yields a further recognition that we participate unevenly, that such 
disparities are systematic, and that there is a loose pattern to how social 
construction takes place (2003, 101). 
 
Ultimately, recognition is not about unconditionally recognizing the self-identifications of 
devalued groups. Rather, recognition entails addressing the unequal status of the participants of 
33 
 
social construction so that negotiations and conflicts over the social meaning of identities can 
occur on a level playing field.      
Several political theorists have already made the move towards a more procedural 
understanding of recognition (see Tully 2000). Most notably, Nancy Fraser’s theory of 
participatory parity is primarily concerned with the effects of misrecognition on democratic 
participation. According to Fraser, to be misrecognized is not simply to be thought ill of or 
devalued by others. Rather, it is “to be denied the status as a full partner of social interaction and 
prevented from participating as a peer in social life… as a consequence of institutionalized 
patterns interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or 
esteem” (Fraser 1998, 141). Hence Fraser argues that justice requires social arrangements that 
permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers (Fraser 2001, 29). What is 
important about Fraser’s conception of recognition is that it redirects our focus to a new object. 
Instead of recognizing identity, we recognize the unequal status of the participants of identity 
construction.      
In Fraser’s deontological formulation, she identifies two preconditions for participatory 
parity. The first is what she calls the “objective condition” to participatory parity, which 
demands that the just distribution of material resources ensures all individuals the ability to 
participate in social life and interact with others as peers. Second, she argues that participatory 
parity requires particular “intersubjective conditions”. That is, it requires that institutionalized 
patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants, thereby precluding 
institutionalized norms that systematically depreciate some groups of people (2001, 29).  
The problem I identify with Fraser’s participatory parity framework is that Fraser’s 
preconditions are the very goals that the process of pursuing recognition attempts to solve. In this 
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way, the framework is tautological. As I understand Fraser, the first precondition mitigates the 
material effects of the social construction of demeaning identities through mechanisms of 
material redistribution. Although debates about material distribution are far from settled—what 
types of resources, how much, to whom— it is fairly safe to assume that most people recognize 
that institutionalized deprivation and exploitation impede participatory parity by denying some 
people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers. If we recall the Creature’s 
statement that “I possessed no money, no friends, no kinds of property” (F, 85), we see that 
material redistribution would successfully mitigate the effects wrought by the materialization of 
devalued identities. 
However, Fraser does not explain how we should achieve the intersubjective conditions 
necessary to preclude institutionalized value patterns that systematically depreciate some 
categories of people and ultimately deter them from achieving participatory parity in the process 
of social construction. Isn’t this is the very problem that the pursuit of recognition attempts to 
solve? Ultimately, I think that a return to a Foucaultian understanding of discourse offers some 
insights here. Foucault’s insistence on the plurality of discourse and language, and the 
impossibility of fixing meaning once and for all, implies that social meanings are temporary, 
contextual, and open to challenge. Therefore, I argue that resistance also involves the 
resignification of social meaning by displacing hegemonic meanings through practices of 
deconstruction and re-creation.  
Some contemporary feminist accounts of deconstruction elaborate on the role of 
deconstruction as political practice. In Gender Trouble, for example, Judith Butler locates the 
political “in the very signifying practices that establish, regulate, and deregulate identity” (Butler 
2006, 201). In Butler’s words,  
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Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the 
very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally 
intelligible…The critical task [for feminism] is… to locate strategies of 
subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local 
possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of 
repetition that constitute identity, and therefore present the immanent possibility 
of contesting them (2006, 201).       
 
In this way, the deconstruction of identity establishes as political the very terms through which 
identity is articulated: for Butler, revealing the fictive and “unnatural” character of sex through 
deconstruction is a political act (2006, 203).  In her discussions of political subversion and 
agency within the heterosexual matrix, drag successfully parodies and mocks gender identities 
by revealing the performativity of gender. Thus, the revelation—the unmasking of 
“foundationalist fictions”—allows for the resignification of meaning. Deconstruction is political 
practice.  
 Likewise, Patricia Hill Collins also explores political resistance through the 
resignification of social meaning in Black Feminist Thought. According to Collins, “the authority 
to define societal value is a major instrument of power” (Collins 2000, 69), so a central 
component of resistance thus involves resignification. Historically, discursive power structures 
have portrayed black women as stereotypical “mammies,” matriarchs, welfare recipients, and 
“hot mammas.” These degrading images are largely constructed by institutions external to 
African-American communities, such as schools, the news media, and government agencies. Yet 
Collins also suggests that these images are also perpetuated within the black community itself, in 
the family, church, historically black colleges, and other Black civic organizations, since nobody 
is “outside” of discourse (2000, 86).  
In an attempt to understand how black women can construct independent self-definitions 
within a context where black womanhood remains routinely derogated within discursive 
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structures of power, Collins argues that resistance requires a two step process. First, black 
women must deconstruct and unpack hegemonic ideologies by “coming to recognize that one 
need not believe everything one is told and taught” (2000, 286). Yet, Collins argues that because 
deconstruction is simply reactive, successful resistance also requires constructing counter-
hegemonic knowledge that empowers and values African-American women. Because black 
women have responded to their treatment in a variety of ways, their self-affirmed identities have 
taken a variety of forms within a range of public and private spaces. For instance, writers such as 
Alice Walker and Toni Morrison have both captured the struggles of forming positive self-
definitions in their writings and creatively declared their own visions of what black womanhood 
means to them (2000, 93). The Blues tradition and other African-American forms of music have 
provided another location where women have come to challenge the externally defined 
controlling images used to justify black women’s subordination (2000, 105-106). 
As Butler and Collins remind us, deconstruction is political practice. While Mary 
Shelley’s contributions to political thought have often been overlooked and undervalued, my 
reading of Frankenstein suggests that Shelley strategically used the novel format to debunk one 
of the dominant misrepresentations of her contemporary reality and condemn the exclusionary 
social and political practices of her time through literary deconstruction.7 Several of the themes 
within Frankenstein were undeniably influenced by Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman, Godwin's An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Percy Shelley's Romantic 
poetry. Yet, Mary Shelley is more than one of England's most notable literary heiresses. She is a 
                                                 
7
 Other authors have already argued that Shelley is an early deconstructivist. In “Three Women’s Texts and a 
Critique of Imperialism”, Gayatri Spivak reads Frankenstein as a text that contests the very notion of a unified 
subjectivity and, hence, the underpinnings of imperialist ideology. While I note Shelley reveals the “foundationalist 
fiction” of the assumption that the body is an external marker of an internal “self,” Spivak offers a deconstructivist 
perspective of the novel as a text of “nascent feminism” where the binary opposition of male/female are undone in 
Victor Frankenstein’s womb-laboratory (1985, 243-261).     
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political theorist in her own right. As I have tried to show, the tragedy of Frankenstein behooves 
contemporary theorists concerned with the political pursuit of recognition to fully consider the 
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